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Although international law has expanded its reach to areas as varied
as business transactions, health issues, the environment, the maritime
arena, and even warfare, it has had little impact on the practice of intelli-
gence gathering. This outcome is not the product of neglect, but rather of
the imperatives of intelligence gathering in the twenty-first century,
which themselves are shaped by international politics. Careful attention
to the causes of war between rational nation-states shows that efforts to
regulate intelligence gathering during peacetime will have the highly
undesirable result of making war more, rather than less, likely. Proposals
for international treaties to govern intelligence collection are not only
premature, but will likely prove counterproductive to the goal of promot-
ing international peace and stability.
Intelligence includes two distinct processes-the collection of in-
formation and its analysis. Discussion of international rules designed to
govern intelligence generally focuses on collection, rather than analysis,
which by itself does not appear to raise significant issues of relations
between states. Collection can take several different forms, such as hu-
man intelligence, or HUMINT, which refers to information gathered by
contacts and other means involving individuals; signals intelligence, or
SIGINT, which includes electronic surveillance and intercepts of com-
munications; and information gathered by satellites and aerial
reconnaissance, among other means. Collection can be covert, in that it
is not undertaken officially but rather secretly, or it can be in the open,
such as monitoring sources such as newspapers and government pro-
ceedings.
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For purposes of this Article, we will discuss the dimension of intelli-
gence which involves the "collection of information through various
surreptitious, intrusive means inside a foreign nation's territory without
that nation's knowledge or consent."' These types of intelligence opera-
tions have long been considered to rest within the power of nation-states,
particularly during times of war. The Geneva Conventions already ad-
dress some of the issues of intelligence gathering during times of war,
such as the treatment of spies.2
The question before us is whether international law is useful or re-
quired to govern the covert intelligence-gathering activities of nation-
states during peacetime. The very notion that international law is cur-
rently capable of regulating intelligence gathering is dubious. In fact, we
suggest that international regulation of intelligence operations could
have the perverse effect of making international conflict more, rather
than less, likely. Certainly, there is legitimate space for coordination and
cooperation between states in sharing intelligence,3 but such "sharing"
does not involve significant needs for universal regulation by interna-
tional law. Simply stated, it is not in the interests of nation-states or the
international system to permit regulation of their intelligence-gathering
activities. This Article will explore both the historical and current views
of intelligence gathering, U.S. domestic issues related to regulation of
intelligence operations, and the benefits of refraining from regulating
such operations through an international entity or via international law.
II. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
Nations have gathered intelligence since the beginning of time.4 His-
torical accounts of the ancient world commonly discuss the activities of
spies and the importance of accurate information in determining the out-
comes of battles and wars. The regulation of wartime intelligence
activities has been an issue for nation-states for centuries and is best em-
bodied in the Geneva Conventions of 19495 and Additional Protocol I of
1977 to the Geneva Conventions.6 These treaties do not attempt to im-
1. See Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International
Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 217 (1999).
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
3. SIMON CHESTERMAN, SHARED SECRETS: INTELLIGENCE AND COLLECTIVE SECU-
RITY 1-10 (2006).
4. See generally Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 321 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 5.
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125
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pose a comprehensive regulatory framework on the gathering of intelli-
gence, but rather focus on the treatment of certain classes of individuals,
basically spies, who engage in covert intelligence activity. Fundamen-
tally, peacetime regulation of intelligence activities has always and
consistently been held to be within the sole province of domestic law. In
the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius summed up the state of the law
regarding intelligence operations during his era:
Spies, whose sending is beyond doubt permitted by the laws of
nations-such as spies whom Moses sent out, or Joshua himself,
if caught are usually treated most severely. "It is customary,"
says Appian, "to kill spies." Sometimes they are treated with jus-
tice by those who clearly have a just case for carrying on war; by
others, however, they are dealt with in accordance with that im-
punity which the law of war accords. If any are captured who
refuse to make use of the help of spies, when it is offered to
them, their refusal must be attributed to their loftiness of mind
and confidence in their power to act openly, not to their view of
what is just or unjust.'
Peacetime intelligence gathering allows nation-states to judge poten-
tial threats more accurately and to choose between peaceful or hostile
courses of action. Intelligence gathering often provides the basis for the
jus ad bellum. Indeed, many scholars today still assert that a nation-state
that engages in peacetime intelligence activities does not violate the law.
Hays Parks, one of the U.S. military's leading thinkers on the laws of
war, has observed:
Nations collect intelligence to deter or minimize the likelihood
of surprise attack; to facilitate diplomatic, economic, and mili-
tary action, in defense of a nation in the event of hostilities; and
in times of "neither peace nor war," to deter or defend against
actions by individuals, groups, or a nation that would constitute
a threat to international peace and security (such as acts of ter-
rorism) .8
It is well established by international practice that a state has the in-
herent domestic authority to punish those it has captured who have
engaged in spying. Captured spies derive no "rights" to legally defend
U.N.T.S. 3. Notably, the United States has not ratified Protocol I. See also CHESTERMAN,
supra note 3.
7. HUGO GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE bk. III, ch. IV, xviii (F. Kelsey
trans., Oxford 1925) (1625).
8. W. Hays Parks, The International Law of Intelligence Collection, in NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 433-34 (John Norton Moore & Robert F Turner eds., 1999).
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their actions, other than those they may acquire through the domestic
legal system of the state that has captured them. But this does not mean
that intelligence gathering violates international law. Scholars of interna-
tional law, such as Oppenheim, assert that peacetime intelligence
gathering "is not considered wrong morally, politically or legally .......
Nation-states do not prohibit most intelligence activities by their own
agents. In fact, the United States has codified, under domestic law, its
authority to conduct intelligence operations in the National Security
Act.' ° State practice throughout history also supports the legitimacy of
spying." Nowhere in international law is peaceful espionage prohibited.
Domestic law punishes captured spies not because they violate some
universal norm against espionage, but because they have engaged in in-
telligence operations against national interests."
Intelligence collection has been, and continues to be, necessary for
the national security of a nation-state. Notwithstanding the concerns
some have raised that intelligence gathering may transgress the territorial
integrity and political independence of a country, in violation of the UN
Charter,'3 most experts today still agree that espionage remains part of
the sovereign right of the nation-state. " The offended nation-state often
condemns the acts themselves, but the acts are not illegal under interna-
tional law. The burden of proof should rest with critics of intelligence
collection to show that the United States and other states that ratified the
UN Charter understood its terms to preclude not just the use of force in
certain situations, but also the less invasive process of intelligence col-
lection in peacetime. There appears to be little evidence that the
representatives of the leading powers at the San Francisco conference
believed Article 2 or Article 51 of the UN Charter would prohibit intelli-
gence collection, or that the United States and the other members of the
Security Council, when they ratified the Charter, did so with that under-
standing. Indeed, the practice of these states in the years following the
adoption of the Charter would suggest the opposite.
Intelligence collection does not rise anywhere near the level of a
pressing need for international legal regulation-let alone that of a per-
emptory norm. International law ordinarily emerges through state
9. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 862 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
10. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. ch. 15).
11. See generally Demarest, supra note 4.
12. Parks, supra note 8.
13. See Quincy Wright, Espionage and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in Internal
Affairs, in ESSAYS ON ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 12 (Roland J. Stranger ed.,
1962).
14. See Loch K. Johnson, On Drawing a Bright Line for Covert Operations, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 284 (1992).
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practice. In some cases such as genocide and slavery, such actions can
rise to the level of jus cogens; restriction or prohibition of espionage has
never reached even the level of custom, let alone attained jus cogens
status within the international community. Simply put, the practice of
nation-states reveals a strong preference, for myriad reasons, for engag-
ing in espionage activity fully aware that if caught, the offended state
retains the right to punish offenders accordingly (and with almost no
resistance afforded to the state engaging in this activity). Few, if any,
patterns of state practice by those states capable of significant intelli-
gence activity appear aligned against the collection of intelligence.
Few have questioned whether intelligence collection activities vio-
late international law.'" Some have expressed concern about the ethics
(not legality) of covert intelligence collection but have later recanted
their concerns as the reality of world affairs interceded. For example,
former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson closed the cryptographic
division of his office in 1929, stating, "Gentlemen do not read each oth-
ers' mail."'' 6 However, he later rescinded that order as the realities of
emerging threats from Asia and Europe became apparent. In fact, no se-
rious proposals have ever been made to prohibit intelligence collection
as a violation of international law. 7 There are numerous examples of
states, particularly those with the resources, capabilities, and national
will to conduct intelligence collection, engaging in such activities in both
the past and the present. Russia, China, the United Kingdom, Israel,
France, Germany, Japan, the Koreas, Cuba, and countless others have,
and do, engage in intelligence collection and covert action.' 8 Nation-
states will continue to regulate this activity through domestic legislation
and protect themselves through counterintelligence programs. Legisla-
tion is often enacted to protect the national security of one state from the
intrusions of another. Although some may assert that the act of espionage
violates the longstanding principle of refraining from violations of an-
other nation-state's territorial integrity,'9 there remains the reality of
long-accepted practice.
15. But cf Manuel Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses
Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REv. 65, 79-80 (1964) ("Though international
law does not explicitly condemn wartime espionage, peacetime espionage is regarded as an
international delinquency and a violation of international law.").
16. See David M. Crane, Counterintelligence Coordination within the Intelligence
Community of the United States: Divided We Stand, 12 ARMY LAW. 26, 31 (1995).
17. Parks, supra note 8.
18. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 292. Johnson provides a list of Western operations
ranging from France spying on U.S. officials in Paris in 1964 to Israel's covert weapons sales
to Iran.
19. Wright, supra note 13.
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III. DOMESTIC VIEWS OF INTELLIGENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES
Before rising to the level of a defined norm that could support an in-
ternational convention, intelligence gathering must be sufficiently
understood to construct a working, consistent definition. Although a
working definition of intelligence remains elusive, there are generally
recognized practices relating to intelligence collection that can be agreed
to by most, if not all, states. Intelligence originates with three fundamental
sources: human, documentary, and technical. The first category is derived
from human sources; the second involves any recorded information, re-
gardless of form, and actual items recovered-even material items such as
captured enemy weapons. As mentioned earlier, the third category, techni-
cal intelligence, includes SIGINT, as well as communications intelligence
(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and imagery intelligence




Human collection encompasses both HUMINT and spying. It is per-
formed in peacetime or war and normally involves information that is
not publicly or readily accessible. Such collection can include voluntary
interviews with businessmen, tourists, refugees, or others returning from
a foreign country. It also includes "clandestine" meetings with citizens
of other countries or even information obtained from interrogations dur-
ing war. Espionage is simply a catch-all term for spying activities. The
use of personnel to engage in espionage normally is a means of obtain-
ing myriad information about other countries, whether during peacetime
or war.
B. Documentary Materials
Normally these are written materials (printed, drawn, engraved),
voice recordings, photographs, and any copies or reproductions of such
items. Material "collection" can include weapons, equipment, natural
resources, or other such data.
C. Technical
Signals intelligence emerged as a means of collection with the ad-
vent of the telegraph-and the technology to send such messages in
encrypted format. The ability to capture these transmissions became a
20. Parks, supra note 8.
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tool of the intelligence community. Essentially, the "transmission" is
recognized as public property once a radiated signal enters the public
domain and is available for anyone to detect or collect. The various
forms of technical intelligence include the following:
" Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is the technical in-
formation derived from the interception of foreign
communications by someone other than the intended recipi-
ents. It can be asserted that this practice-the use of
COMINT-has become part of customary international law,
although no states are willing to admit openly that they en-
gage in the activity.
* Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) is technical information de-
rived from foreign noncommunication electromagnetic
radiations emanating from sources other than atomic detona-
tion or radioactive materials. This activity is now commonly
used in military operations known as electronic warfare.
* Imagery Intelligence consists of overhead photographic intel-
ligence and infrared imagery. PHOTOINT consists of
photographs of an area or a specific object; infrared imagery
is a likeness of the image produced by sensing the electro-
magnetic radiations emitted or reflected from a given target.
IMINT objects are ordinarily stationary, unlike SIGINT,
where the signals retrieved are propelled into the air and
viewed as "public property."'"
Domestically, so many components and issues comprise
"intelligence" that it remains difficult to pin down a specific definition.
2
Mark Lowenthal, an expert in intelligence gathering, has noted that
"[v]irtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with
a discussion of what the author believes 'intelligence' to mean, or at least
how he or she intends to use the term. This editorial fact tells us much
about the field of intelligence., 23 Even those who have spent years in the
24field find the term vague. Any international convention on the
peacetime conduct of intelligence collection would prove unsuccessful at
21. Id. These are categories that have been recognized as embodying the general means
of intelligence collection. See generally CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES
ONLY (1995); INSIDE CIA's PRIVATE WORLD: DECLASSIFIED ARTICLES FROM THE AGENCY'S
INTERNAL JOURNAL (H. Bradford Westerfield ed., 1995).
22. See Kristan J. Wheaton & Michael T. Beerbower, Toward a New Definition of Intel-
ligence, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 319 (2006).
23. Id. at 320 (quoting MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POL-
ICY I (2d ed. 2002)).
24. Id.
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the very least because of difficulties in defining exactly what it would
seek to regulate. Defining intelligence and intelligence gathering must
face such vague subject terms as counterintelligence, business
intelligence, foreign intelligence, espionage, maritime intelligence,
space-related intelligence, signals intelligence, and human intelligence.
These subject terms themselves lack a universal definition and the
simplicity in order to reduce the ambiguity needed to regulate
effectively. Currently, the United States defines intelligence as "a body
of evidence and the conclusions drawn therefrom .... It is often derived
from information that is concealed or not intended to be available for use
by the acquirer."25 This vague and overly broad definitional statement
reveals the problems with actually articulating what intelligence is and
what it is not. Without a clear definition of the term (from the United
States or any other state for that matter), we should not expect regulation
of intelligence activities at the international level.
Recent controversies on the lawfulness of engaging in intelligence
activities, both within and outside the United States, suggest it is prema-
ture to seek regulation of intelligence activities at the international level.
Originally raised in public debate during the 1970's, these efforts to re-
strict or cabin the intelligence-gathering function have again become the
subject of political controversy in the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury. There is currently a deep divide within the United States as to the
government's efforts to obtain national security information. For exam-
ple, the National Security Agency (NSA) created the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) 26 in response to the September 11 attacks.
This covert program was revealed publicly only after the New York Times
obtained classified information and subsequently (against the wishes of
the Bush administration) published a story concerning details of the se-
cret program." A firestorm of controversy ensued. Some Democratic
members of Congress suggested that President Bush be impeached for
violating federal law and the Constitution, a view several liberal com-
mentators shared. 28 A group of law professors and the Congressional
25. U.S. Intelligence Cmty., The Character of Intelligence (2005), http://
www.intelligence.gov/2-character.shtml.
26. See JOHN YOO, WAR By OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
T)ERROR (2006) for a discussion of the program.
27. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at Al. Even after the President requested that the New York Times
not print the story, the editors felt compelled to do so, as not reporting the story would be
viewed as undermining their "role" as a newspaper in upholding the "public's right to know."
28. See Interview by WAOK-AM with Representative John Lewis (Dec. 20, 2005)
(declaring that he, Representative Lewis, would sign a Bill of Impeachment if one were intro-
duced in the House of Representatives); H.R. Res. 1106, 109th Cong. (2006). Others who
suggested impeachment included Representatives Conyers and Nadler and Senator Boxer.
[Vol. 28:625
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Research Service argued that the President had broken the law by acting
outside the federal wiretapping statutes.29 In March 2006, Senator Rus-
sell Feingold introduced a motion in the Senate to censure President
Bush for approving "an illegal program to spy on American citizens on
American soil."3° Feingold claimed the TSP was "right in the strike zone
of the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors," referring to the stan-
dard for impeachment.3 With our own internal debates raging as to what
appropriate intelligence gathering entails, it seems most imprudent to
seek regulation at the international level.
IV. PREVENTIVE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PROMOTES PEACE
Sun Tzu, the widely read Chinese strategist, declared that "[w]hat
enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer,
and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowl-
edge."32 Intelligence gathering has been, and continues to be, a means of
looking to the future for answers. It provides knowledge concerning the
activities of enemies before they constitute an immediate threat. Having
access to early information on potential threats allows states to take pre-
cautionary measures to prevent war. Armed with a more complete
information picture, a state can communicate its concerns to rivals, en-
gage in negotiation and diplomatic overtures, and potentially settle
differences in a peaceful manner. If such efforts fail, armed conflict re-
mains an option.
Intercepting enemy communications has long been part of waging
war. Indeed, it is critical to the successful use of force. Gathering intelli-
gence through such means is generally understood as a legitimate aspect
of conducting war. In the 1907 Hague Regulations, one of the first trea-
ties on the laws of war, the leading military powers agreed that "the
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the
29. See ELIZABETH B. BAZEN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESI-
DENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 39-44 (2006); Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance
Authority II, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of
Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id= 1770&wit id=3938.
30. 152 CONG. REC. S2011 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold). See
also S. Res. 398, 109th Cong. (2006) (relating to the censure of George W. Bush); Wartime
Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority II, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold), available at http://
www.feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/statements/06/02/2006206JT.html.
31. Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Sen. Russ Feingold (This Week, ABC
television broadcast, Mar. 12, 2006).
32. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 77 (James Clavell ed., 1983) (n.d.).
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enemy and the country is considered permissible."33 Our military cannot
attack or defend successfully unless it knows where the threat is located.
The United States has a long history of conducting intelligence opera-
tions to obtain information on its enemies. General Washington used
spies extensively during the Revolutionary War. As President, he estab-
lished a secret fund to support spying that existed until the creation of
the CIA.34 President Lincoln personally hired spies during the Civil War,
a practice the Supreme Court upheld.35 In both World Wars I and II,
presidents ordered the interception of electronic communications leaving
the United States.36 Some of the greatest wartime intelligence successes
in U.S. history have involved SIGINT. Most notable is the breaking of
Japanese diplomatic and naval codes during World War II, which al-
lowed the U.S. Navy to anticipate the attack on Midway Island.37
SIGINT is even more important in the twenty-first century war on inter-
national terrorism than in the conflicts of the last century. Al Qaeda has
launched a variety of covert actions to attack the United States, and it
intends to continue doing so. The primary way to stop such attacks is to
find and detain al Qaeda operatives who have infiltrated the United
States. One way to pinpoint their location is to intercept their electronic
communications entering or leaving the country.
Better information gleaned from intelligence gathering, whether
covert or overt, can actually promote the potential for peace and reduce
international tension. One way to understand this, as one of us has sug-
gested elsewhere, is to view war as the result of a failure of bargaining
between states.38 Suppose two nations have conflicting preferences over
an issue, whether it is possession of land, access to trade rights, or de-
velopment of weapons. Assume also that the range of outcomes each is
willing to accept overlap-they have a common "win set." Nevertheless,
the parties must still reach a settlement over the fair allocation of the
good at issue within that win set. That allocation will determine the ex-
pected value of war to each side, which itself is a product of the
33. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 24, adopted Oct. 8,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910). According to one recognized authority,
nations at war can gather intelligence using air and ground reconnaissance and observation,
"interception of enemy messages, wireless and other" capturing documents, and interrogating
prisoners. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 326 (1959).
34. Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
35. Totten, Adm'r v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
36. Exec. Order No. 2604 (Apr. 28, 1917) (World War I order); Exec. Order No. 8985,
6 Fed. Reg. 6625 (1941) (World War n order).
37. ANDREW, supra note 21.
38. See generally John Yoo, Force Rules: U.N. Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT'L




probability of prevailing in war and the value of the asset, minus the
costs of war. The probability of prevailing in war will be determined by
the balance of military strength between the two states. As one state
grows stronger in relation to the other, it will be better able to gain a
greater proportion of the good or territory.39
To illustrate this with a hypothetical, suppose the United States and
China have different goals with regard to Taiwan. China would like to
possess the whole island, while the United States would prefer that the
island remain independent. When the United States held an overwhelm-
ing military advantage over China, especially in naval and air power, it
was able to preserve Taiwan's independence. As the balance of military
power between the two countries begins to shift, Taiwan's status will
become less independent. The value of Taiwan to China may also have
increased recently as China's nationalist ambitions have become
stronger, while perhaps the importance of an independent Taiwan to the
United States has fallen after the end of the Cold War. Perhaps at some
point the two states would be willing to accept a partition of the island
that reflects changes in their military power and the value they place on
Taiwan.
Since war is more costly than negotiation, both states should be will-
ing to accept a negotiated settlement rather than go to war. If the
negotiated settlement arrives at the same point as the outcome dictated
by their relative military power, then the two states can avoid the costs of
war and still reach the same outcome. But a significant obstacle to reach-
ing a negotiated settlement is the problem of imperfect information. Any
state will frequently face situations in which it does not have perfect in-
formation about its adversaries' military strength and willingness to go
to war. One side, for example, may have secret weapons systems that
would give it a much higher probability of winning a conflict. Or one
side may be bluffing about its ability and willingness to go to war in or-
der to trick its opponent into agreeing to a more favorable settlement.
Private information can thus lead the other state to either overestimate or
underestimate the opponent's willingness and ability to fight. This uncer-
tainty can greatly increase the likelihood of armed conflict where the two
states should have been able to reach a negotiated settlement.
Effective intelligence gathering can reduce this uncertainty. Better
intelligence allows a state to determine more accurately the military
strength of the other side and the value it places on the disputed asset. If
the states have a better understanding of the expected value of war to the
39. For more detailed explanation of this model, see ROBERT POWELL, BARGAINING IN
THE SHADOW OF POWER (1999). See also James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49
INT'L ORG. 379 (1995).
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other side, the states will be more likely to reach a negotiated settlement
rather than go to war. Thus, more aggressive intelligence gathering can
reduce the chances of conflict. Any international agreement or norm that
makes it more costly for states to gather better information, and hence
reduce uncertainty, would only increase the possibility of war.
Furthermore, any international regulation of such activity could
ironically make it more difficult for a nation-state to protect itself. In a
more formal sense, intelligence collection can be viewed as a component
of the right of self-defense recognized in the UN Charter. Article 51 pro-
vides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of self-defense. 4 0 Thus, in concert with the Charter's requirement to re-
frain from engaging in armed aggression under Article 2(4),'
intelligence gathering can be "lawful" as a necessary means for nation-
states to defend themselves.
This need for enhanced intelligence gathering as necessary for effec-
tive self-defense is all the more relevant in this current age of
international terrorism. Terrorist groups engage in asymmetric warfare
and have little or no regard for any established international conventions.
Al Qaeda, the primary international terrorist organization in operation
today, spans over fifty countries. It would appear that now, more than
ever, intelligence gathering promotes self-defense for many nation-states
in the West, particularly the United States.42 States have a very real need
to share information and work in concert with other states to prevent
these asymmetric attacks. If international law prevents a nation-state
from engaging in intelligence gathering, some of the immediate benefi-
ciaries would be international terrorists and rogue states.
Nation-states and their intelligence-gathering policies must remain
flexible to meet evolving security challenges. Any international regula-
tory scheme could hamper efforts to frustrate al Qaeda. As demonstrated
by the September 11 attacks, the enemy in this war refuses to obey the
core principles of the laws of war, including any norms in the Geneva
Conventions.43 Al Qaeda has openly demonstrated (and declared) that it
would not abide by any new principles formulated by supranational enti-
ties or international legal instruments. International agreements on the
laws of war depend on fair treatment and reciprocity to be effective."
Any hope for reciprocity is unrealistic with regard to al Qaeda.
40. U.N. Charter art. 51.
41. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 2.
42. Yoo, supra note 26.
43. See Glenn Sulmasy, The Law of Armed Conflict in the Global War on Terror, 19
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 309 (2005).
44. See James D. Morrow, The Laws of War Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems
in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (2002).
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Threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in the possession of
al Qaeda, or nation-states that support or harbor such international ter-
rorists, place even greater demands on intelligence operations. In
response to this prevailing threat scenario, the current U.S. National Se-
curity Strategy 5 envisions the use of preemption as a means of
preventing attacks by international terror organizations. Preemption
makes intelligence gathering even more important. 6 One cannot ade-
quately prepare for or thwart attacks upon the United States or its allies
without a significant degree of reliable information on the extent of the
threat. As the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (and
in a different sense, the Iraq war)47 have shown, an enhanced commit-
ment by nation-states to intelligence gathering is critical to adequately
assessing threats to national security.48 Technological advances, and
weapons of mass destruction in particular, are now available to many
rogue states and nonstate actors who have emerged in the post-Cold War
era. Such immediate threats require the use of intelligence collection to
exercise appropriate preemptive action. International regulation would
limit the ability of nation-states to detect and counter serious existing
threats to their national security.
CONCLUSION
International law has never prohibited intelligence collection, in
peacetime or wartime. State practice has always supported the principle
that such activity, although it can affect the territorial sovereignty of the
target, is nevertheless critical to maintaining peace and international se-
curity. The history of state practice reveals that the regulation of
intelligence gathering has always been left to domestic enforcement. 9 In
addition, no internationally recognized and workable definition of "intel-
ligence collection" exists. The current threat of international terrorists
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, requires intelli-
gence gathering that protects nation-states and promotes peaceful
resolutions of potential conflicts. Calls to pursue the establishment of
45. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
46. See generally RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS (2005).
47. Many critics of the existing regime will assert the failures of intelligence collection
and analysis in justifying the use of force in Iraq in 2003 as indicia of the need for greater
cooperation and intelligence sharing. Again, sharing must be distinguished from international
regulation.
48. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 3.
49. See Demarest, supra note 4.
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international entities or international law to regulate the intelligence-
collection activities of nations-states are counterproductive.
